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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from a final Judgment dated January 2, 1997, of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Spanish Fork Department, in and for Utah County, State of Utah This case was
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint when Appellee has no standing to sue Appellant under the amended cause of action and
without granting Appellant any relief for prevailing on the original issues? The court affords no
deference to the trial court'sfindingsin reviewing whether a party has standing. State v Taylor. 818
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
II.

Did the trial court err in signing the Order granting Motion for Leave to file Amended

Complaint five (5) days before it was mailed to the court on March 15, 1996, and entering the same
on June 26, 1996, without giving Appellant any notice that the same had been granted or entered?
"Whether a party has reasonable notice is a factual determination that [the court] review[s] under a
clearly erroneous standard." Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin.. 889 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct. App 1995)
III.

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment when

Appellee admitted in its Amended Complaint and Motion to file the same, and in its discovery
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responses, that Appellant did not owe the money prayed for in the Complaint, and in fact, had already
paid such sum? A trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law which is
reviewed de novo for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) (citing
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); Hunsakerv. State. 870 P.2d 893,
896 (Utah 1993)).
IV. Did the trial Court err in granting Appellee's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment
when such Motion and supporting pleadings were not served on Appellant's counsel, when Appellee
was not a party to any contract with the Appellant and received no assignment of any interest in the
amount requested in the motion, and when the allegations of the supporting Memorandum were
entirely unsupported by any evidence in the record before the Court? A trial court's grant of a
motion for summary judgment is a matter of law which is reviewed de novo for correctness. White
v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).
V.

Did the trial court err in signing and entering the Judgment on the same day it granted

the Counter Motion for Summary Judgment and without giving Appellant's counsel any notice of the
grant of the motion or opportunity to object thereto and without giving Appellant any notice of the
existence of or execution of the Judgment, or opportunity to file an objection thereto? "Whether a
party had reasonable notice is a factual determination that we review under a clearly erroneous
standard." Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin.. 889 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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VI. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant due process of law? Because statutory and
constitutional interpretation presents questions of law, the court will grant the trial court no deference
in applying a correction of error standard of review. Cache County v. Property Tax Division. 922
P.2d 758 (Utah 1996).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. AND RULES
The determinative statute, rule and constitutional provision is:
Utah Const, art 1, §7.
Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
On or about September 23, 1995, Mr. Thomas Mower was served with a Ten Day Summons
and a Complaint alleging that Mr. Mower incurred a debt to Mountain Fuel on May 30, 1991 in the
amount of $475.60, and that Mr. Mower was liable for attorneys fees as provided in said contract *
Mr Mower filed his Answer on October 3, 1995.
Desiring to understand the basis of this claim, Mr. Mower, not having been a consumer of
Mountain Fuel natural gas at any pertinent time, asked his counsel to send Plaintiff discovery requests

*At this point, it is proper for Mr. Mower to cite to the record. However, the trial court
judge has precluded the defendants from doing so. When preparing this brief, the trial court judge
refused to allow Mr. Mower's counsel to check out the record on appeal even after the clerk of
the Utah Court of Appeals instructed him to do so. See accompanying affidavit attached to
Appendix A hereto.
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on October 10, 1995, containing Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents.
Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. ("Bonneville") served its Answer to Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents on Mr. Mower on November 9, 1995. In said responses,
Bonneville indicated that the claim was based on a May 30, 1991 contract with Mr. Mower to allow
a pipeline to be placed on his property.
The contract did in fact call for a $475.60 payment, which was the basis for the lawsuit.
However, the contract also reflected that Mr. Mower had paid said amount in full. Mr. Mower's
counsel pointed out the same to Plaintiffs counsel, expecting the matter to be dismissed with an offer
of reimbursement for Mr. Mower's attorney's fees, as provided for in the contract.
Soon thereafter. Plaintiff moved the court to forget about the $475.60 cause of action which
was the basis for the lawsuit, and then to amend the Complaint so Bonneville could bring a new and
separate cause of action, without first confessing judgment and awarding attorney's fees on the
original cause of action.
The new cause of action suggests that Mr. Mower owes Bonneville $301.50 for some
unevidenced failure to use natural gas. However, Mr. Mower has never been billed for any such
$301.50 amount and has never been informed of the basis for any such debt. Furthermore, the only
assignment that Bonneville received from Mountain Fuel was for the $475.60 amount, which Mr
Mower paid. There is no assignment for the $301.50 amount.
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Mr. Mower and his counsel were not served a number of important papers, and pleadings
below, either by Bonneville or the court, which non-service greatly and detrimentally prejudiced Mr.
Mower, to wit:
1.

The signed Order granting Motion For Leave to File Amended Complaint which was
signed by the court on March 10, 1996, apparently five days before it was mailed to
the court on March 15, 1996. Said Order was entered thereafter on June 26, 1996,
without notice to Mr. Mower;

2.

Mr. Mower did not receive Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was dated December 6, 1996. There was no
Mailing Certificate to accompany said memorandum either;

3.

Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 6, 1996,
Supporting Affidavit dated December 11, 1996, Supporting Memorandum dated
December 6, 1996 (which was date-stamped on December 12, 1996), and
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements which is undated. Appellee appears to
have submitted a "catchall" Mailing Certificate for some of these documents attached
to the Counter Motion for Summary Judgment falsely certifying to the Court that
counsel mailed them to Defendant's Counsel on December 13, 1996, mailed after they
were received by the Court; and,
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4.

Judgment signed on January 2, 1997, the same day of the lower Court's Ruling, and
the same day Defendant's Opposing Memorandum was mailed.

Without knowledge of the above-named pleadings and court orders, Mr. Mower's counsel
prepared and submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment based on Mr. Mower's payment of the
$475.60. Bonneville cross-moved for summary judgment for the amended claim of $301.50. Mr.
Mower was not served with these pleadings. The Court granted Bonneville's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Mr. Mower's motion, despite Bonneville's admission that Mr. Mower had
paid said $475.60. Mr. Mower was never served with a copy of the Judgment.
Mr. Mower's counsel first became aware of the existence of the Order granting Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint and the Judgment when counsel was preparing Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment. Furthermore, there exists no document or paper
purporting that either was served on Mr. Mower's counsel or that counsel was aware of either.
Mr. Mower's pleadings and posture below were based on his understanding that the Court failed
to grant the Motion to Amend. The Judgment was not served on Mr. Mower's counsel prior to
its submission to or entry by the Court. Mr. Mower had no opportunity to object to the form or
content of the Judgment.
Because of the lack of notice that the court had granted Bonneville's Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint, Mr. Mower did not have the proper information to successfully oppose the
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Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the trial court entered Judgment on
January 2, 1997.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant Mr. Mower asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in no less than
six instances in this litigation. First, the trial court abused its discretion by granting Defendant's
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Second, the trial court failed to give adequate
notice to Mr. Mower that the Motion to file the Amended Complaint had been granted which
prevented Mr. Mower from properly refuting the summary judgment motions. Third, the trial
court erred by not granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the $475.60 cause of
action after both parties had agreed that said amount had been paid in full. Fourth, the trial court
erred by granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment when the Plaintiff below has no
standing to sue Mr. Mower and the supporting pleadings were not served on Mr. Mower, which
precluded him from introducing evidence in opposition that there were genuine issues of material
fact. Fifth, the trial court erred by signing and entering the Counter Motion for Summary
Judgment without giving Mr. Mower's counsel notice of the grant of the Motion or entry of the
judgment with an opportunity to object thereto. Finally, the trial court violated Mr. Mower's due
process rights by not giving Mr. Mower notice of said motions and judgments which precluded
Mr. Mower from submitting evidence in support of his rights.
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ARGUMENT
Mr. Mower asserts that the trial court committed at least six errors which were substantial,
prejudicial, and adversely affected the outcome of the motions before the trial court. Based upon
these errors, the Judgment should be reversed as a matter of law.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT.
The trial court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. As outlined

above, this Plaintiff was assigned a debt amount of $475.60, which amount constituted the basis
for the original complaint. Mr. Mower proved he had paid such amount. No assignment for any
other debt exists, and absent an assignment, this Plaintiff has no cause of action against Mr.
Mower for a $301.50 debt.
The court below granted Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint when on the face of the
complaint, the Plaintiff had no cause of action against Mr. Mower. If Mountain Fuel had a cause
of action against Mr. Mower for $301.50, it could have filed an action on its own behalf, or
assigned its rights to Plaintiff. Mountain Fuel made no such assignment of any such cause of
action, however, and Plaintiff had no standing to amend the complaint with the new cause of
action. Therefore, the court below clearly erred in granting leave to file the Amended Complaint.
In the alternative, if this court finds that the Plaintiff did in fact have standing to sue Mr.
Mower, this court must reverse the trial court's grant of the Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint because the trial court abused its discretion. "The decision to allow leave to amend a
8

complaint is discretionary with the trial court." Stratford v. Morgan. 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah
1994). However, a trial court cannot abuse its discretion by doing so. Girard v. Appleby. 660
P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). To determine if a court properly may allow leave to amend a complaint,
Utah Courts have used three factors for guidance: "(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the
justification given by the movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding
party." Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co,, 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Regional
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court did
not properly consider the latter two prongs in its analysis to grant the motion for leave to amend.
First, the party moving for the court to grant the motion to amend must give the court a
justification as to why the complaint should be amended. The record shows that Plaintiffs counsel
claims to have inadvertently filed a claim for an amount that had already been paid to Plaintiffs
assignor. See Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend; Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Upon realizing that it had filed a baseless lawsuit, Plaintiff tried to cover its mistake
by alleging that another amount was due under the contract. A party's lack of preparedness and
investigation of the facts cannot be a justification for the trial court to grant a motion for leave to
amend a complaint.
Furthermore, the trial court prejudiced Mr. Mower by allowing the Plaintiff to amend its
complaint to the $301.50 cause of action. "In considering a motion to amend, the trial judge must
decide 'whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue
9

adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare.'" Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746 P.2d 1189
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Berkins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)).
By amending the complaint, and then by not supplying notice to Mr. Mower of the amended
action, Mr. Mower was not able to properly prepare arguments in opposition to the Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Furthermore, if Mr. Mower had received notice of the grant for leave to amend, Mr.
Mower could not have successfully defended his rights because Plaintiff refused to answer in the
underlying discovery the reasons for which the $301.50 claim was owed. See Plaintiffs Answer
to Interrogatories and Requests for Productions of Documents Nos. 5 & 6. Because of the trial
court's granting of the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, Mr. Mower did not
have the opportunity to prepare and argue in opposition to the Counter Summary Judgment
Motion. The trial court's actions are a clear example of an abuse of discretion by prejudicing Mr.
Mower's rights. Therefore, the court must reverse the trial court's order on granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GIVING NOTICE TO MR. MOWER THAT IT
HAD GRANTED THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Mr. Mower is entitled to certain rights under the laws of the State of Utah and the United

States of America. One right that a person possesses is to receive notice of an action taken against
him by a court of law. A failure for a court to give such notice is a violation of the Utah
Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7; Plumb v. State of Utah. 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990).
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In this case, by granting the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, the court
enabled the Plaintiff to try and collect a debt of $301.50, which was never demanded, billed, or
requested in any form before the filing of the Motion to Amend, without giving notice to Mr.
Mower. Once the court granted such motion to amend, Mr. Mower was entitled to know about
that fact. See id. No notice was sent to Mr. Mower concerning such fact, and Defendant notes
from the record that as late as May 22, 1996, (at least two months after the date of the Order)
Plaintiff submitted its Notice to Submit for Decision the Motion to Amend that this Court
purportedly signed on March 10, 1996. In other words, Bonneville had no notice of the grant of
the motion at that late date either.

Ill

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING MR. MOWER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER BOTH PARTIES AGREED THAT THE $475 60 DEBT
HAD BEEN PAID IN FULL.
The trial court erred by denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the $475 60

cause of action. "Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law." Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 857 P.2d 263,
265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "On appealfroma summary judgment, [the court] views the evidence and
all reasonable inferences thereon in the light most favorable to the appellant." Kleinert v Kimball
Elevator Co.. 854P.2d 1025 (UtahCt. App. 1993^ (quoting Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1158
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(Utah 1991)). By reviewing the evidence in the record, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
should have been granted.
Plaintiffs counsel admitted in filing its Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint that Mr.
Mower had already paid the $475.60 which was the basis for this lawsuit. Because both parties agree
that the $475.60 debt has been paid, no genuine issues of material fact exist. Bonneville made no
motion to dismiss its claim and Mr. Mower did not stipulate thereto. Mr. Mower is entitled to his
attorney's fees and costs of court on the $475.60 cause of action as provided under the subject
contract. Therefore, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and award costs and attorney's fees to Mr. Mower.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS WERE NOT SERVED ON DEFENDANT
AND THE EVIDENCE FOR WHICH THE COURT BASED ITS RULING IS NOT
WITHIN THE RECORD.
A discussion on the standard of review of a summary judgment motion is set forth above in

Part III of this brief. Furthermore, a party must have adequate notice of an action by the court to
satisfy due process requirements. See Utah Const, art 1, §7. By receiving timely and adequate notice,
the party receives a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Cornish Town v. Roller. 798 P.2d 753,
756 (Utah 1990). By applying that law to the facts of this case, Plaintiffs Counter Motion for
Summary Judgment should have been denied.
First, Mr. Mower was entitled to receive notice that a motion for summary judgment and
supporting pleadings had been filed. Mr. Mower received no notice. This was prejudicial to his case
12

because Mr. Mower would have been able to submit evidence to the court that would have
contradicted the assertions made by Plaintiff. This would have created genuine issues of material fact.
For example, Plaintiff states in its Motion for Summary Judgment: "Despite repeated requests,
billings and attempts to obtain payment, Defendant failed and refused to pay the amounts due and
owing and this matter was assigned to Plaintiff." See Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Summary
Judgment. Mr. Mower would have been able to refute this assertion by submitting evidence that
Plaintiff did not repeatedly request the $301.50 payment, that Mr. Mower did not have any
information of what constituted the $301.50 debt and that he did not owe this debt, and that Plaintiff
had not been assigned the $301.50 debt. This would have refuted Plaintiffs allegations and there
would have been genuine issues of material fact. However, Bonneville and the trial court deprived
Mr. Mower of this right by not notifying him of all of the court action. Therefore, the court must
reverse the trial court's grant of Plaintiffs Counter Motion for Summary Judgment.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING AND ENTERING THE JUDGMENT ON
THE SAME DAY IT GRANTED THE COUNTER MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND WITHOUT GIVING MR. MOWER'S COUNSEL ANY NOTICE OF
THE GRANT OF THE MOTION OR AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT THERETO, AND
WITHOUT GIVING ANY NOTICE TO MR. MOWER OF THE EXISTENCE OF OR
EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT.
Defendant was entitled to receive a copy of the proposed Judgment before it was submitted

to or signed by the Court pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration. The code
states in pertinent part:
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and
counsel within five days after service.

Mr. Mower was given no opportunity to object thereto, or to raise any of the procedural
defects or anomalies present in the grant of Plaintiffs motion. Mr. Mower would know nothing
about the existence of the Judgment but for a late mailed Notice of Judgment, dated January 13,
1997, certified mailed on January 15, 1997, metered on January 16, 1997, and received by Mr.
Mower's counsel on January 21, 1997. Because Mr. Mower was denied his legal rights to object
to or oppose the order of the lower court, this court should reverse the trial court's order and
judgment.
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED MR. MOWER'S DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The entire tenor of this action has been one of denial of Mr. Mower's basic procedural and

notification rights under the laws and customs of the Courts of this State. See Utah Const, art.
1, §7; Plumhv. State of Utah. 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990); Cornish Town v. Roller. 798 P.2d
753, 756 (Utah 1990); Nelson v. Jacohsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Mr. Mower did
not timely receive notice of specific allegations about him that were before the court. In addition,
he did not have notice of the Judgment with costs and attorney's fees entered against him for a
debt for which he was never billed and for which a demand for payment was never made. Said
Judgment has been rendered to an entity that was not a party to any contract with Mr. Mower by
any operation of law, including by an assignment of the debt, and that has no standing to sue Mr.
Mower.
Moreover, the signing of the Judgment simultaneously with the Ruling of the Court, with
no or little consideration of Mr. Mower's arguments which were only signed and served that same
day, and no notice or opportunity to respond to the proposed Judgment as provided by law was
improper. Furthermore, when preparing this appellate brief, the trial court again denied Mr.
Mower's rights by not allowing his counsel to check out the record on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
Orders and Judgment entered by the Fourth District Court and enter judgment for Mr. Mower
and against Bonneville on both Motions for Summary Judgment, and award Mr. Mower his
costs of court, costs on appeal, and attorney's fees below on appeal.
Dated this 19th day of June, 1997.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT in Appeal No. 970102-CA were mailed, U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid to the following.
WILFORD N. HANSEN JR. #1352
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee
2970 South Main Street, #202B
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Dated this P~3> day of June, 1997.
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APPENDIX

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BONNEVILLE BILLING &
COLLECTIONS, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

COURT OF APPEALS

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 951369 CV
vs.
No. 970102
TOM MOWER,
Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANGELA HOWELL

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN BACKLUND, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I, Angela Howell, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am a legal assistant to counsel for Appellant herein.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit.

Affidavit of Angela Howell - Page 1

3.

On the morning of June 19, 1997, I telephoned the Spanish Fork Courthouse

and spoke with a woman named Linda. I explained to her that we needed to have the aboveentitled record released so that Mr. Thompson could prepare the brief in this case. Linda
indicated to me that the record could not be released. She explained that the only way that we
could get the record would be to have their file copied at a cost of .25 cents per page.
4.

I relayed this information to Mr. Thompson. He said he was under the

impression that the Court released the record and the attorneys did not have to pay for copying
fees. He asked me to call the Court of Appeals to find out if that was the proper procedure.
5.

On that same day, I telephoned the Court of Appeals and spoke to a Cindy. I

explained the situation to Cindy. She went to check with her supervisor and then came back to
the phone. She said that usually the record is just to be released to the attorney, without any
fees being paid. She explained that they were not in the business of calling Courts and telling
them how to run their offices. She told me to call back the Spanish Fork Court and explain
what she had said and maybe they would release the file. She indicated that if that did not
work I could call her back and she would see what else could be done.
6.

I telephoned the Spanish Fork Court again. I spoke with Linda again and

explained what the Court of Appeals had said. She said that she would call Cindy at the Court
of Appeals and then talk to Judge Backlund and get back to me.
7.

On June 19, 1997, at 11:55 p.m., Linda from the Spanish Fork Court called me

back. She said that she had called the Court of Appeals and she had given that information to
Judge Backlund. She said, "The Judge has refused to release the file". I asked if we needed to
pay .25 cents per page. She said, "Yes, I am sorry". She indicated that we already have a lot
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of the documents, and that we could bring what we had to the Court and she would make
copies of anything that we did not have.
8.

I relayed this information to Mr. Thompson and he requested that I prepare an

affidavit regarding the phone calls.

DATED this P 3 ~day of June, 1997.

//

[lAU\tU> fhnJjJJ

ANGELA (HOWELL
Affiant
v

Subscribed and sworn to me by Angela Howell, who is personally known to me to be
the person who signed the foregoing document, in my presence, on this A±5 " day of June,
1997.

NOTARY PUBLIC ^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing Affidavit of Angela Howell to be served on
the Defendant by mailing a true copy thereof by first-class United States Mail, postage
prepaid, on this " j . ; ^ day of June, 1997, to the following:

Wilford N Hansen, Jr.
1172 East Highway 6, #7
Payson, Utah 84651
)

v^ ?L^
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